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• Sense and Avoid (SAA) from now on referred to as Detect and Avoid 
(DAA) was defined in the final report of the FAA sponsored Sense and 
Avoid Workshop as “the capability of a UAS to remain well clear from and 
avoid collisions with other airborne traffic”
• DAA comprises two functions Self-separation (SS) to maintain well clear 
(WC) and Collision avoidance (CA) 
• The integration of UAS in the NAS required the development of a 
quantifiable definition of WC to enable the implementation of SS 
automation to provide the pilot in command (PIC) with situation awareness 
and maneuver guidance
• The NASA developed DAA reference implementation used in all the NASA 
experiments described in this presentation has been recently renamed; 
the formerly known Stratway+ algorithm is now referred to as DAIDALUS 
(Detect and Avoid Alerting Logic for Unmanned Systems)
Sense and Avoid, Detect and Avoid and other Acronyms
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• A TCAS-compatible self-separation concept was developed that 
centers on the interoperability of UAS with the airspace system, 
air traffic control (ATC) services, and with existing aircraft 
equipped with the Traffic Alert & Collision Avoidance System 
(TCAS)
• The foundation of the interoperability concept was a time and 
distance based WC volume determination designed to avoid: 
• Corrective resolution advisories (RAs) for Traffic Alert and Collision 
Avoidance System (TCAS) II Version 7 (or higher) equipped 
intruders 
• Undue concern for proximate see and avoid pilots 
• Traffic alert issuances by controllers
Concept of integration for UAS operations in the NAS 
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Horizontal Miss
Distance (HMD)
(Declaration Time) (TCAS “Tau” Boundary)
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CAS 1, CAS 2, and CASSAT Airspace 
Simulation
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Scenarios focused on ATC sector handling arrivals to Collin County Regional 
(McKinney – TKI), ~28 nmi NE of DFW. Airspace includes Class B, D, E, and G and 
numerous non-towered airports
• Traffic in the scenarios 
includes 14 scripted 
encounters per hour between 
General Aviation aircraft 
(transponding but not in voice 
communications with ATC), 
and (large) UAS in class E
• Approximately 40 to 45 
additional (background) 
aircraft per hour
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Objectives: Is there a range of SS horizontal miss distances (HMD) 
acceptable to air traffic controllers that can be applied to the 
development of SAA algorithms?  Is this range affected by encounter 
geometry and/or speed differential, and if so, how?
Approach
• A set of simulated “well clear encounters” with different horizontal 
miss distances, encounter geometries, and relative speeds were 
embedded into simulated background traffic scenarios 
representative of TRACON traffic (IFR and VFR) on a calm, clear-
weather day
• ATC subjects were instructed to "control” the simulated traffic 
scenarios, 
• Acceptability measures were recorded by direct query after each 
encounter based on a numerical rating scale that ranged from (1 
(too close) to 5 (too far)
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Controller Acceptability Study 1 (CAS 1)
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CAS 1 Design
Subjects
14 retired air traffic controllers 
Independent Variables
• Horizontal Miss Distance (6 values: 0.5, 1.0, 1.5, 2.0, 2.5, 3.0 nmi)
• Encounter Geometry (3 values: opposite-direction, crossing, overtake)
• Intruder opposite-direction at 180 degrees +/- 15 degrees (non-crossing)
• Intruder to right at 90 degrees +/- 15 degrees (crossing)
• Intruder ahead at 0 degrees +/- 15 degrees (overtaking, non-crossing)
• All geometries without vertical separation (but may include climbing/descending trajectories)
• Ownship passes to right of intruder for non-crossing geometries
• Ownship passes in front of intruder for crossing geometries
• Intruder Speed Differential (5 values for crossing: 0, +/- 40, +/- 80 kts)
• 42 test conditions: 6 opposite-direction, 6 overtake, 30 crossing
• 6 One-hour test sessions enabled a replicate for each encounter
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CAS 1 Results: Ratings for Opposite Direction 
Encounters 
The plot above shows Mean Ratings for opposite 
direction encounters.
Plot of frequency of Rating responses for 
opposite direction encounters.
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Note: All Horizontal Miss Distances required a UAS lateral maneuver (initially a collision course)
Mean of 14 ATC subjects for each encounter, 1176 HMD acceptability ratings
Controller Acceptability Ratings
1
Too close; unsafe
2 
Somewhat close, 
some cause for 
concern
3 
Neither unsafely close 
nor disruptively large
4 
Somewhat wide
5 
Excessively wide; 
potentially disruptive
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CAS1 Conclusions
• Based on 14 ATC Test Subjects, 1176 Horizontal Miss Distance 
Acceptability Ratings
• A horizontal miss distance (HMD) of ~1.5 nmi appears to be optimal 
for ATC acceptability (away from the airport vicinity), but anything 
greater than 1.0 nmi is acceptable
• 500’ IFR-VFR vertical separation (with no vertical closure rate) was 
universally acceptable as noted during debrief sessions (some 
controllers were Ok with less)
• Controllers think the SAA integration concept as presented is 
absolutely viable
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Controller Acceptability Study 2 (CAS 2)
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Objectives: Assess the impact of modeled communication delay on the 
execution of SS procedures as defined in UAS CAS1 experiment as well as 
the impact of simulated winds on the implementation of SS maneuver 
guidance
Specific Questions:
• Are the range of SAA SS maneuvers identified in the UAS CAS 1 
experiment as acceptable by air traffic controllers in simulation 
scenarios with no delay still acceptable under realistic communication 
delays? 
• Are the TCAS interoperability design requirements still maintained 
under these delays?
• Do delays affect controller perceptions of unsafe conditions? 
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CAS 2 Design
Subjects
7 Retired air traffic controllers 
Independent Variables
• Horizontal Miss Distances (HMD),  3 values:  0.5, 1.0, 1.5  nautical miles
• Wind Conditions,  2 values:  Calm (~7 knots) and Moderate (~22 knots)
• Communications Delay,  4 values:  0, 400, 1200, and 1800 msec (one-way 
times)
• Encounter Geometry,  3 cases:  Opposite-direction, Overtake, Crossing
– Intruder Opposite-direction at 180 degrees +/- 15 degrees (Non-crossing)
– Intruder at 90 degrees +/- 15 degrees (Crossing)
– Intruder ahead at 0 degrees +/- 15 degrees (Overtaking, Non-crossing)
– All geometries without vertical separation (but may include climbing/descending 
trajectories)
– Intruder Speed Differential (5 values for Crossings: 0, +/- 40, +/- 80 knots)
• 42 test conditions: 6 Opposite-direction, 6 Overtake, 30 Crossing
• 14 encounters per hour, 6 hours of testing over two days, 84 total encounters
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CAS 2 Findings
• Pilot maneuver guidance worked successfully in the presence of 
winds
• HMD Ratings Consistent with CAS1, ~1.5 nmi found most 
acceptable by the subjects in the presence of winds and 
communications delays
• Delays of 400 ms or less were found acceptable
• Delays of 1200 ms or more were found unacceptable, leading to 
confusion, “step-ons” and distress
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Objectives
Two part experiment investigating the integration and interoperability of alerting and 
maneuver guidance of CA (TCAS II) and SS (DAIDALUS) functions. In Part 1, 
subjects were active air traffic controllers and in Part 2 subjects were UAS pilots
Specific Questions
• Given a projected well clear loss, what are the minimum and maximum 
acceptable alerting time?
• Is there an interaction between Alerting Time and HMD?
• Given the TCAS alerting symbology sets, does the change in display icons 
(between caution and warning) affect the saliency of alert levels to the UA pilot?
• In vertical encounters, does prediction of time to co-altitude (TCOA) affect 
acceptability of the Alert?
• Are the CAS 1 and CAS 2 conclusions regarding HMD and delays still valid for 
active controllers as subjects?
• Are controller-pilot interactions impacted by the different alerting thresholds? 
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Collision Avoidance, Self Separation, and 
Alerting Times (CASSAT)
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CASSAT Design
Subjects
Part 1: 10 active air traffic controllers 
Part 2: 12 IFR/UAS ground control station pilots
Independent Variables
– Horizontal Miss Distance (0.7, 1.0 and 1.5 nmi) (per draft MOPS 
recommended range)
– Alerting Times (used by DAIDALUS algorithms)
• 30 sec, 45 sec, 75 sec for Part 1
• 40 sec, 60 sec, and  75 sec (per draft MOPS recommended range) for  Part 2 
– Time to Co-altitude (TCOA) for vertical encounters
• 0 and 20 sec 
• Vertical Rates 1000 and 3000 feet per minute (between encountering aircraft)
– Alerting structures (Part 2 only)
• Draft MOPS
• CASSAT
Variables from CAS1 and CAS2 held constant
– Wind – only medium wind profile for all encounters (20 kts)
– Communications delay – 400 msec for all UAS voice communications
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Alert Name Alert Level Intended Function Pilot Action Visual Alert Aural Alert
Resolution 
Advisory (RA)
Warning Indicate Collision Risk
Follow TCAS RA maneuver, or 
“Monitor Vertical Speed” if Preventive 
RA
10 TCAS Aural Alerts 
plus “Clear of 
Conflict”
Self Separation 
Warning Alert 
(SSWA)
Warning
Indicate imminent Loss of 
Well Clear (LoWC), no time 
to coordinate with ATC
Maneuver now to avoid LoWC, notify
ATC as soon as practicable after 
taking action
“Traffic, Maneuver
Now”
Corrective Self 
Separation Alert 
(CSSA)
Caution
Indicate future LoWC, still
time to coordinate with ATC
Coordinate with ATC and follow 
corrective-bands maneuver guidance 
as applicable to remain well clear
“Traffic, Separate”
Preventive Self 
Separation Alert 
(PSSA) 
Caution
Indicate proximate aircraft 
which have <700’ vertical 
separation with ownship
Monitor aircraft for maneuvers that 
might elevate alert level.  Avoid 
climbing/descending into preventive 
bands
“Traffic, Monitor”
SS Proximate 
Alert (SSPA) Advisory
Indicate proximate aircraft: 
those which are blocking 
some turns and/or
climbs/descents (i.e., 
causing preventive bands)
Consider these aircraft when planning 
a maneuver and avoid turning or 
climbing/descending into preventive 
bands.  Monitor aircraft for maneuvers 
that might elevate their alert level.
None
None N/A
Display traffic within sensor 
detection range
N/A
N/A
Alert Structure 2: Draft MOPS 
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Alert Structure 1: CASSAT 
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Collision 
Avoidance 
Alerts
Self-
Separation 
Alerts 
TCAS 
RAs
Level 4 
SSMA
Level 3 
CSSA
Level 2 
PSSA
Level 1 
SSPA
Level 0 
None
(No Aural)
(No Aural)
(No Aural)
(No Aural)
“Traffic, Maneuver 
Now”
(TCAS Aurals)
Self-
Separation 
Alerts 
Collision 
Avoidance 
Alerts
TCAS 
RAs
Level 4 
SSWA
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CSSA 
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PSSA
Level 1 
SSPA
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None
(No Aural)
(No Aural)
“Traffic, 
Monitor”
“Traffic, 
Separate”
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Now”
(TCAS Aurals)
CASSAT and Draft MOPS Alert Structure
Side by Side
CASSAT DAA Alert Structure + TCAS CA Draft MOPS DAA Alert Structure + TCAS CA 
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CASSAT Initial Observations
• Part 1: Air Traffic Controllers as subject (all 10 subjects completed)
– Unanimous agreement on concept viability.
– Controllers gained trust with exposure.
– Generally low comfort level with 0.7nm horizontal miss distance.
– Unanimous agreement on 500ft vertical well clear definition.
• Part 2: UAS pilots as subjects (six of fourteen pilots completed).
– All pilots agree that
• UAS integration concept and procedures are viable.
• Avoidance (SS) maneuver bands provide useful, informative and pertinent 
information.
• Recovery bands provide intuitive and useful guidance to regain well-clear
• There should be a visual differentiation between the Self-Separation Maneuver 
Alert and a TCAS Resolution Advisory.
• TCAS Resolution Advisories during self-separation maneuvers are undesirable.
– Four pilots preferred the CASSAT alerting structure, while two preferred the 
draft MOPS alerting structure.
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Summary
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• Overview of HITL DAA research and development work conducted 
at NASA Langley Research Center in support of the UAS in the 
NAS project 
• Three HITL experiments, CAS-1 and CAS-2 and CASSAT were 
briefly described, all part of the research plan designed to address 
interoperability and acceptability questions associated with the 
integration of UAS with manned aircraft operations in non-
segregated airspace 
• Next steps in the research plan will address the impact of 
imperfect surveillance on SS algorithm performance and pilot’s 
acceptability
• Much research remains to be done to develop and validate the 
technology and operations needed for UAS integration without 
affecting the safety of the NAS.
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Questions?
22
Maria Consiglio
Maria.c.Consiglio@NASA.gov
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Backup Slides
23
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
About the Flight Tests
(1) GA-FAA-NASA Flight Test
Objectives:
• Verify stability of DAIDALUS with real sensor data
• Receive pilot feedback on DAIDALUS display
• Flight Test 3 Risk Reduction
Design
• Ikhana UAS – King Air Intruder - 17 Total trials
• Head-on, 20, 45, 90, 135 degrees
• Sensor varied between Radar only and Radar + ADS-B
• Closest point of approach (CPA) offset between 0 and 1.5nm
• Only 1 UAS operator
Results
• Self-separation guidance from DAIDALUS was effective
• DAIDALUS was stable with real sensor  data
• Sensors performed as expected – no outstanding or new issues
• Operator was able to use the DAIDALUS guidance to maneuver
• Display was usable, understandable
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GA-FAA-NASA Flight Test
Observations
• Alerting time afforded by DAIDALUS 
reflected in operator behavior
• The operator reacted more quickly in 90 
and 135 degree encounters
- Perceived as more urgent
• DAIDALUS guidance allowed the 
operator to stay well clear in the 
challenging 135 degree encounters
• The operator made larger maneuvers 
than needed
- Operator “primed” by collision avoidance trials
- No return to course required  
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About the Flight Tests
(2) Flight Test 3 – UAS in the NAS project
Objectives
• Similar to (1) but with a full sensor suite
Design
• Two different flight configurations, DAIDALUS was part of configuration 1 only 
(Pairwise encounters) 
Initial Observations
• Data not analyzed yet
• DAIDALUS flights were very successful based on observations 
• Sensors performed as expected – DAIDALUS performance not affected
• Pilots feedback on bands maneuver guidance and display was very positive
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